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 The public service in Australia is required to deliver apolitical ‘frank and fearless advice’ 
to government. It is also expected to support the development and implementation of 
policies for the government of the day.1
 
In recent times, in Australia and elsewhere, doubts have arisen about the ability of public 
servants to maintain the balance between these activities, and much has been written 
about a perceived politicisation of the public service. Two separate, but interrelated, sets 
of circumstance have fed these debates. The first of these is the occurrence of various 
events at the political level, in which the role of the Australian public service (APS) has 
been criticised or questioned, such as the ‘certain maritime incident’; the detention and 
deportation of Australian citizens by the Department of Immigration and Indigenous 
Affairs; payments made by the Australian Wheat Board to the Hussein regime; the 
management of the Haneef case; and the role of a senior public servant as the face of the 
government’s WorkChoices media campaign. The second is the introduction into the 
public service of new models of organisation, administration and behaviour, known 
collectively here as New Public Management or NPM. 
 
Though the implementation of NPM has been tailored by different governments to their 
differing requirements, in Australia its underpinning principles have been broadly 
supported by political parties in Australia since its emergence in the 1980s. The overall 
aim of NPM was (and is) to make the public service more flexible and efficient, and more 
responsive to government. Key components of NPM at the Commonwealth level in 
Australia have included making the work of public servants contestable; the introduction 
of performance management, including individual performance assessment and pay; the 
devolution of centralised managerial controls to individual agencies; the re-structuring of 
public sector industrial relations according to contract-based models; and the outsourcing 
of complex service delivery to non-government organisations. Most people working 
within, and writing about, the public service during the implementation of NPM reforms, 
have accepted that these disciplines have improved its flexibility and efficiency. But 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a forthcoming publication from the Australian and New Zealand School of 
Government and will be available in December 2007–January 2008 through the ANU E Press at 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/titles/anzsog.html
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within the broader system change, the new disciplines of NPM offer the means to reshape 
relations between government and the public service in less benign ways. 
 
One of the key NPM disciplines is contestability. Almost immediately following the 1996 
change of government, the new government made it clear that it was now up to public 
servants to prove that they could offer the government services it required as efficiently 
and effectively as the private sector.2 At the same time, as if illustrating the point, the 
government reduced the size of the public service by around 10 000 people in each of the 
years 1997, 1998 and 1999.3  The new onus of proof for public service delivery raised a 
notoriously difficult question of what services were core public sector services and 
therefore not contestable, and what were non-core. According to the then Auditor-
General, the answer was that ‘any definition of core government seems to be constantly 
changing…including even those that would be considered to be traditional public 
services, such as policy, legal advising, corporate management and the delivery of 
welfare services'.4
 
How, in practice, does the requirement that public servants contest their right to deliver 
policy advising services for government impact on their understanding of what it means 
to be apolitical? Where, for example, are individual public servants meant to draw the 
line between offering advice that is responsive to government and consistent with its 
policies— a critical APS value —and advice that downplays, ignores or dismisses critics 
of those policies? How can government agencies compete with organisations that say 
(because it suits their constituency or because they too are competing) what a government 
prefers to hear? Does apolitical professionalism—another critical APS value—really 
represent a competitive edge in getting the attention of ministers in a contestable system? 
The answer to that question is likely to depend on the ministers and the circumstances 
concerned. A survey of public servants conducted in the 2003–04 financial year by the 
                                                 
2 See The Hon Peter Reith, Towards a Best Practice Australian Public Service, Discussion Paper issued by 
the Minister for Industrial Relations and the Minister assisting the Prime Minister for the Public Service 
(Canberra, 1996), p. x and Pat Barrett, ‘Corporate Governance in the Public Service Context’, Canberra 
Bulletin of Public Administration, No. 107, March 2003, p. 8. 
3 Australian Public Service Commission, Australian Public Service Statistical Bulletin, 2004–05, Table 1, 
p. 13. 
4 Barrett, ‘Corporate Governance in the Public Service Context’, p. 8. 
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Australian Public Service Commission found that, of those who had had contact with 
ministers and their advisers over the previous two years, 35 per cent had encountered a 
‘challenge in balancing the need to be apolitical, impartial and professional, responsive to 
the government and openly accountable in dealing with ministers and/or ministers’ 
offices’.5 This finding has remained remarkably stable over time.6 
 
Surveys have also established a direct correlation between employees’ confidence in their 
ability to balance being responsive, apolitical, impartial and professional, and their views 
on whether senior managers in their agency lead by example in ethical behaviour. In 
2005, just over half of the public servants surveyed (51 per cent)7 said that their senior 
managers did lead by example. In 2006, the number was 55 per cent8—and that is 
averaged out across both ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ agencies. This figure means that, in a 
number of agencies, more than half of all employees surveyed may not have experienced 
ethical leadership from their senior their managers. In response to a second question on 
whether, in their experience, the most senior managers in their agency acted in 
accordance with the APS values, 28 per cent of public servants could not agree (and a 
further 3 per cent did not know). Nevertheless, in a devolved public service environment, 
the most senior managers in an agency are responsible for providing guidance on 
appropriate and inappropriate professional behaviour, as well as systems and processes 
for raising and examining concerns about breaches of the public service values and code 
of conduct. 
 
Devolution has also given agency heads and senior managers other means of providing 
guidance to their employees about what is expected of them. These include performance 
assessment and pay, agency attraction and retention policies, and agency remuneration 
strategies. Take individual performance assessment and pay systems, for example. An 
                                                 
5 Public Service Commissioner, 2003–04 State of the Service Report, p. 40.  
6 According to the Public Service Commissioner’s 2004–05 State of the Service Report, 33 per cent of the 
relevant population said they had faced such a challenge in the last 12 months, and 6 per cent were not sure. 
The 200203 State of the Service Report data is also comparable: about one third of those employees who 
reported having had contact with their ministers or ministerial advisers in the last two years reported having 
faced a challenge in that relationship but the question establishing the relevant population was slightly 
different in that year http://www.apsc.gov.au/stateoftheservice/0203/chapter4.pdf. 
7 Public Service Commissioner, 2004–05 State of the Service Report, p.179. 
8 Public Service Commissioner, 2005–06 State of the Service Report, p. 58. 
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individual performance focus can only be sustained where what ministers expect, what 
agency managers expect, and what public servants do are transparent and consistent with 
each other. This line of sight is particularly critical in agencies where it is understood that 
‘our Ministers are our customers—they are always our first priority and we aim to exceed 
their expectations in the services that we provide’.9 What happens, then, when agency 
protocols meet ministerial media statements of the dog-whistling variety—as has 
happened in the cases of immigration and welfare. Are agency staff meant to conduct 
their decision-making as if they are dealing with ‘refugees’ or ‘terrorists’, ‘unemployed 
jobseekers’ or ‘welfare cheats’? In the absence of clear direction from agency heads, they 
may not find out which set of performance criteria really apply until they are given their 
next performance rating. Little wonder, then, that an ANAO survey of public servants 
detected a perception among public servants of ‘a substantial gap between the rhetoric 
and the reality’ of performance expectations,10 and that around two thirds of them did not 
agree that, in their experience, the performance pay system in their agency contributed to 
a workplace culture that upholds the APS values.11  
 
Devolution has also given agency heads the power to reinforce vertical lines of control 
and to break down collective culture in their own agencies by putting into their hands the 
power of settling the agency’s industrial arrangements, including non-union agreements 
and individual employment contracts (AWAs). These new industrial arrangements are 
structured to discourage the growth of service-wide ‘connective tissue’, to isolate 
employees industrially, and to increase their sensitivity to leadership values. They have a 
rhetoric of their own that does not necessarily represent workplace realities—a kind of 
industrial spin—in which ‘soft’ human resource management theory is used to cover a 
transition to ‘hard’ human resource management practice. The government presented its 
industrial agenda to its employees in the same way that it presented that agenda to 
employees generally: as a matter of improving productivity by fostering direct relations 
                                                 
9 Department of Finance, Annual Report 2001, available at 
http://www.finance.gov.au/pubs/annualreport00%2D01/fin%5Fannual%5Freport/ch2/chp2%5Ftxt2.htm. 
10  Australian National Audit Office, Performance Management in the Australian Public Service, ANAO 
Audit Report No. 6, 2004–05, p. 14, para 9 http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/documents/2004-
05_Audit_Report_6.pdf  
11 Australian Public Service Commission, 2005–06 State of the Service Employee Survey Results, p. 50 
question 70. 
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between employees and employers that would have the effect of aligning their interests. 
What the government delivered in the APS as elsewhere was an increase in managerial 
prerogative. As in the cases of contestability and performance management when 
considered separately, these industrial arrangements have the effect of encouraging 
public servants to take a narrowed and short-term view of the requirement to be 
responsive to the expectations of the employing agency and of the ‘ultimate employer’12, 
the government of the day. 
 
These issues are of concern because although NPM has undoubtedly increased the 
capacity of public servants to achieve results, it has exposed decision-making to new 
disciplines that interact in ways that increase their exposure to party-political direction. 
These disciplines have been internalised by the public service in ways that leave it much 
less protected against pressures towards politicisation than it has been over its earlier 
history. This is not to deny the increased efficiency of the public service, nor does it mean 
that it is necessary to revisit history and undo what has been done in the name of 
restoring a balance that has always been difficult to sustain. There are, however, ways of 
re-adjusting the system so that public servants are better able to distinguish themselves 
from ministerial servants. The problem is to retain the flexibility and performance 
orientation of NPM but to reduce the negative impact of existing disciplines (a short-term 
solution) or to introduce more balanced disciplines (a solution for the longer term). These 
are not mutually exclusive alternatives. 
 
As we move through, and then beyond, a 2007 election, the changing role of the public 
service will probably not be at the forefront of political debate. The development of that 
role in the next few years will, however, influence the workings of Australian democracy 
in sensitive times. 
                                                 
12 Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, ‘APS—Supporting Guidance for the Workplace 
Relations Policy Parameters for Agreement Making in the Australian Public Service’ (June 2004), p. 4. 
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